By Ovigwe Eguegu
Last week, the leaders of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) ordered the activation of the ECOWAS Standby Force to return constitutional order in Niger. At the event President Tinubu of Nigeria and current ECOWAS chair also stressed that diplomacy is the 'bedrock of our approach' to Niger.
However, the summit’s declaration, which put the Standby Force on a war footing, further raised the stake. As the ECOWAS summit got underway, Niger’s junta formed a transitional government made-up of mostly civilians.
The emergence of a new government is not only a sign of further consolidation of power, but it also goes against requests by ECOWAS, the US and EU for the reinstatement of ousted President Bazoum. ECOWAS is now in a position where it has to make a big move, the question is whether the move will be diplomatic or military or a combination of both.
Diplomatic deadlock
Following the coup on July 26th, the ECOWAS levelled sanctions against Niger and gave a one-week ultimatum to the junta to reinstate President Bazoum. In response, neighbouring Mali and Burkina Faso already released joint statement opposing the plan for possible military intervention.
The two countries are also military-led and stated “all military intervention against Niger will be considered equivalent to a declaration of war against Burkina Faso and Mali”.
August 3rd saw the arrival of an ECOWAS delegation in Niamey as part of mediation efforts, but the delegation did not stay the night nor did they meet coup leader Abdourahamane Tchiani or deposed President Mohamed Bazoum; a poor outcome of the attempt and a signal of deadlocked negotiations.
On the same day Senegal declared its willingness to contribute troops to any ECOWAS mission in Niger and in response, the junta stated "any aggression or attempted aggression against the State of Niger will see an immediate and unannounced response from the Niger Defense and Security Forces on one of (the bloc's) members, with the exception of suspended friendly countries."
The crisis in Niger has split the region between countries that support the junta and other west African countries that are expressing willingness to explore all options to ‘restore democracy’ in the country.
Foreign interests cannot be ignored in assessing ECOWAS’ handling of the crisis and threat of military intervention.
The United States has also expressed support for ECOWAS and its actions, while the junta on the other hand reportedly warned US diplomats that the deposed president Bazoum will be killed if a military intervention were to occur.
Over the weekend, protesters in front of the French military base in Niamey called for the withdrawal of French troops from Niger. And across the border in Nigeria’s northern city of Kano, hundreds protesters took to the streets marching against a military intervention in Niger and calling for leaders to find a diplomatic solution.
Eroding French Influence
For context, the coup in Niger is the 6th in the region since 2020 and much like the coups in Mali, Burkina Faso and Guinea, the reasons for overthrow have centred around poor governance, rising insecurity, and lack of economic development.
Another factor has been the strong current of anti-colonial sentiment, particularly towards France, among citizens of these countries, which were under the colonial influence through so-called Françafrique.
Furthermore, on the security background of the region, France had deployed more than 5,000 troops under Operation Barkhane, and organised the G5-Sahel force, while the UN’s MINUSMA force operated a 15,000-troop force and the EU in its own capacity had special force units under Operation Takuba. Over the 9 years of the operations, violence and terror in the region increased.
As of September 2022, when the Traore-led coup in Burkina Faso took place, armed insurgents controlled 40% of the country’s territory and it was in this context, that France and European allies lost all credibility as security partners in the region.
In neighbouring Mali, French troops were expelled after nine years and in Burkina Faso a 2018 agreement was terminated and in both instances, the expulsion of the French were celebrated by local populations and there is also a notable increase in pro-Russian sentiment.
Similar sentiments abound in Niger, with popular support for the junta which contrasts with foreign calls for the ‘restoration of democracy’.
Niger is also of critical geostrategic importance to Europe with its vast reserves of uranium, with over 50% of its uranium ore going to France’s nuclear energy sector, while 24% of the EU’s uranium import is said to be from Niger.
So it came as no surprise when after the coup, the French government stated sternly that it will respond if “French interests in Niger” were harmed.
Furthermore, Niger plays a critical role in the Sahel strategies of France, the U.S. and the EU. Niger hosts a French military base and the United States as well operates a drone base and an airbase making Niger the main platform for AFRICOM and other military operations in West and North Africa.
With these factors in place, it stands to reason that these Euro-Atlantic allies would employ measures to reverse the coup and reinstate preferred leadership in Niger.
It should be noted that tensions are high, and uncertainty continues in West Africa. Bolstered by popularity at home, and calls against an intervention from some regional countries, the Junta would likely continue ignoring ECOWAS’s demands.
If no diplomatic headway is made ECOWAS backed by foreign actors, intervenes militarily, the risks of a regional war are high. Avoiding this scenario would require some concessions from both ECOWAS and the leaders in Niamey.
On the other hand, Africans in the region are more concerned about insecurity and poor economic conditions.
It is also of note that while the situation in Niger and the wider region is unpredictable and fast unravelling, Africans do not want another rash military action that further destabilises the region much like the aftermath of the destruction of Libya by NATO coalition.
The author, Ovigwe Eguegu, is a Policy Analyst at Development Reimagined. He focuses on geopolitics with particular reference to Africa in a changing global order.
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect the opinions, viewpoints and editorial policies of TRT Afrika.
