By Karya Naz Balkiz
For yet another year, the world watched on as existing power dynamics tore at the seams of the failing global order. But from its corner of the map, Türkiye quietly changed the game.
From Damascus to Mogadishu, Ankara’s influence shaped some of the year’s most pivotal geopolitical moments, leveraging a mix of strategic diplomacy and steadfast humanitarian assistance.
One of the year’s defining moments came on December 8, when Bashar al Assad fled Syria after opposition forces executed a rapid takeover of key cities from Aleppo to Damascus.
“While Türkiye was not directly involved in the military developments, the outcome was, in large part, a result of Türkiye’s policies” that reshaped not only the Middle East but also the country's role in the wider region, Ankara-based foreign policy and security expert Omer Ozkizilcik tells TRT World.
In 2020, Türkiye launched Operation Spring Shield in Syria’s Idlib region, which helped prevent the fall of the Syrian opposition and gave them the space to regroup, retrain, and ultimately gain the upper hand against Assad’s forces.
“The opportunity that was presented by the war in Ukraine and the Israeli escalation with Iran could only be seized by the Syrian rebels thanks to the Turkish protection of Idlib and northern Syria,” Ozkizilcik explains.
“After the Syrian people, the biggest winner here is Türkiye.”
Türkiye’s diplomatic outreach in 2024 stretched far beyond its immediate borders. From mediating in Africa to challenging global power structures, Türkiye has positioned itself as a key player in the international arena.
Power beyond borders
Türkiye has long opposed the Assad regime due to its brutal crackdown on dissent and its alliance with the PKK/YPG, the terrorist group behind the killing of tens of thousands of civilians.
Still, Ankara repeatedly called on Assad to reach a political compromise with the opposition to resolve the 13-year civil war. But Assad refused to come to the negotiating table, hoping that his allies — Russia and Iran — would come to his rescue like before.
“Moscow and Tehran’s initial harsh response was a bluff that revealed the limits of their power and influence,” says Ozkizilcik, explaining that while Iran emerged as the biggest “loser” alongside Assad, Russia’s influence in Syria also waned significantly despite its foothold in Hmeimim and Tartus military bases.
But Ankara threaded a delicate balancing act with its Astana partners. Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan's discussions with Russian and Iranian counterparts at the 2024 Doha Forum on December 7 helped facilitate the transition in Syria, paving the way for Assad’s departure while maintaining diplomatic ties and goodwill.
According to Ozkizilcik, Türkiye now stands to play a pivotal role in Syria's future, shaping the country’s reconstruction efforts and influencing broader geopolitical dynamics.
Assad’s fall was a strategic win that aligns with several of Ankara’s key goals, including the secure return of refugees and stability in the region, he adds.
But the impact of what has happened in Syria goes beyond the region.
Professor Ozden Zeynep Oktav from Istanbul Medeniyet University suggests that Russia and Iran's withdrawal from the region has also initiated a new period of cooperation between Türkiye and the United States — a development that will continue to unfold in 2025.
A fallout of Israeli aggression
Oktav says Israel’s escalating attacks on Gaza and beyond formed the impetus behind Türkiye’s “highly proactive” foreign policy in 2024 as Ankara acted to establish its leading presence in the region.
Türkiye has been one of the most vocal critics of Israeli atrocities. The government of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan continuously pushed for a ceasefire and unhindered humanitarian access to the Palestinians on multiple international forums.
Unlike other countries, Türkiye's efforts go beyond rhetoric — the country has been providing substantial humanitarian aid to Gaza, and in May 2024, it imposed a complete trade embargo on Israel.
In August, Ankara joined the International Court of Justice (ICJ) case holding Israel accountable for genocide in Gaza and hosted Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas in Parliament.
“Türkiye’s approach has always been different,” Oktav notes. “While other nations have prioritised their economic interests and adopted a pragmatic stance, Türkiye has consistently placed humanity and morality at the centre of its foreign policy.”
Ankara’s foreign policy has garnered so much trust that during a December visit, Lebanon's Prime Minister Najib Mikati, at a joint news conference with Erdogan, expressed that Lebanon’s “trust in Allah, and in our friends, especially Türkiye, has been our strength.”
At the same time, Türkiye's foreign policy prioritises stability, firmly anchored in preserving determined borders.
This approach is notably visible in its backing of the Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders and calls for preserving the territorial integrity of a unified Syria against threats from Israel and PKK/YPG terrorists.
Challenging a failing world order
With Gaza as an impetus, Türkiye took its critique of the global system to new heights in 2024.
As the international community remained paralysed against the ongoing Israeli atrocities, Türkiye amplified its voice, demanding a more democratic and inclusive United Nations that could better address the world’s most urgent crises.
Türkiye’s call for reform within the UN Security Council, particularly regarding its failure to act on issues like the wars in Gaza and Ukraine, was a key pillar of Ankara's broader vision for a multipolar world order — one where power is shared more equitably among nations.
Simultaneously, Türkiye deepened its engagement with rising global players, most notably through its growing ties with BRICS.
Türkiye’s participation in the Kazan summit in October 2024 and its partnership status reflects a strategic shift towards diversifying its diplomatic relationships.
Nevertheless, while aiming for a more central role in the emerging multipolar world order, Türkiye also underlined that its BRICS involvement does not replace its NATO ties or European Union aspirations.
“Türkiye does not act as though it is in a unipolar world led by the US,” explains Oktav of Istanbul Medeniyet University. “Yet it remains loyal to its NATO identity and continues its EU accession process, striking a unique balance.”
In January 2024, Türkiye officially approved Sweden’s NATO membership, reaffirming its commitment to the alliance in light of Russia-Ukraine war.
The approval was contingent upon Sweden’s cooperation with Türkiye on counterterrorism and crackdown against the PKK, highlighting how Ankara can leverage its clout within the bloc when it comes to the safety and security of its citizens.
Türkiye has also made notable progress in its relations with Greece.
When President Erdogan and Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis met on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly on September 24, both leaders expressed a commitment to fostering “good neighbourliness.” However, key issues remain unresolved, including the demilitarisation of the Aegean islands and the dispute in the island of Cyprus.
Türkiye supports a two-state solution in Cyprus and backs the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) in the face of longstanding tensions.
A foray into Africa
“But one of the most important developments in 2024 was that Türkiye pulled Ethiopia and Somalia away from the brink of a war that threatened stability in the Horn of Africa,” Oktav tells TRT World.
In December 2024, Türkiye ended nearly a year of tensions between the two African nations on maritime access to the Red Sea by leveraging its strong diplomatic ties with both countries.
“Successfully mediating conflicts was once viewed as the exclusive domain of Western powers. But now, Türkiye is stepping in and making it happen where they fail to do so,” says Oktav.
With an ever-expanding role on the global stage, Türkiye has focused on Africa, driven by humanitarian and historical ties dating back to the Ottoman Empire.
“A stable Africa means a strong Türkiye,” is the prevailing sentiment in Ankara, and Türkiye’s increasing presence in peacekeeping, development cooperation, and humanitarian aid reflects this vision, says Murat Yigit, a political scientist at the National Defence University in Istanbul.
Looking back at the tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia, Yigit says the involvement of foreign actors from the Arabic-speaking countries caused further polarisation rather than reconciliation and increased the potential for greater conflict.
Building on the momentum of Somalia and Ethiopia’s reconciliation, Türkiye has expressed readiness to mediate between Sudan and the UAE. The two countries are embroiled in tensions amid Sudan's civil war since Abu Dhabi sided with the Sudanese army’s rival, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) paramilitary group.
Experts are once again hopeful of Türkiye’s contribution.
“Türkiye has a real chance to build peace in the region,” says Yigit, stressing that Ankara’s increasing involvement in Africa is no longer limited to development and aid — it is becoming a key security partner, with defence cooperation agreements, technology transfers, and military training further strengthening its diplomatic influence.
Beyond mediating conflicts, Türkiye has been actively working to build on existing ties with other countries.
Consolidating gains
In 2024, significant strides were made in Türkiye’s relations with Egypt and Armenia, marking milestones in its broader strategy of improving ties with key regional players.
Erdogan’s visits to Cairo in February and Sisi’s return visit to Ankara in September — which was his first since taking office ten years ago — highlighted a renewed commitment to bilateral cooperation. The rapprochement with Egypt, particularly on issues like Gaza and humanitarian access, is crucial for Türkiye’s interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and North Africa.
Meanwhile, the normalisation of ties with Armenia, underscored by multiple rounds of talks around the first half of 2024, reflects Türkiye’s broader strategic shift toward stability and cooperation in its immediate neighbourhood.
“In recent years, the Turkish state has made significant gains ranging from Libya to Qatar to Somalia, and now Syria. Türkiye wants to consolidate its gains without provoking an anti-Turkish alliance,” Ozkizilcik explains.
Yet another country that Türkiye has worked to strengthen cooperation with is Iraq. In April, the two countries signed several memoranda and initiated the Development Road Project.
The Development Road Project aims to enhance connectivity between Iraq, Türkiye, and Europe, offering a vital alternative to shipping routes disrupted by ongoing conflicts.
“If realised, this project could reconcile various regional issues—from energy and economic ties” to security, “and most importantly, it would further sideline Iran,” Oktav explains.
Equally significant was the growing cooperation between Türkiye and Iraq this year on security matters, particularly in the fight against the PKK. Iraq’s move to officially outlaw the PKK in March and the establishment of joint operation centres aligned the two countries in countering terrorism along their shared borders.
The past year was a defining period for Türkiye’s foreign policy, marked by bold diplomacy, advocacy, and peacemaking.
Türkiye’s foreign policy is not bound by Western frameworks or traditional concepts like “smart power or soft power,” says Professor Ozden Zeynep Oktav.
Instead, Türkiye has cultivated a unique approach that goes beyond the pursuit of material gains such as wealth, weapons, or territorial expansion and exploitation.
“It is a foreign policy focused on universal values. This is what sets it apart.”
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