As Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan embarks on a three-day tour of three Gulf nations, marks a new phase in Ankara’s relations with energy-rich Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in a new global order.
This is Erdogan’s first official visit to the region since his re-election as President in May, cementing his position as one of Türkiye’s most influential leaders ever.
The Gulf countries were among the first to congratulate President Erdogan on his victory, signalling improving relations between Ankara and the region.
“The visit reflects Türkiye’s win-win strategy in its foreign policy”, as their cooperation will benefit and empower both sides, says Helin Sari Ertem, professor of International Relations at Medeniyet University.
During Erdogan's visit, Türkiye is expected to sign important agreements in energy, infrastructure, defence and economy.
Erdogan’s visit marks the shifting sands in bilateral relations, especially with UAE and Saudi Arabia. Over the past few decades, experts say the Gulf nations have started to acknowledge Türkiye’s position as a bridge between the West, balancing its relations with different actors, ranging from the Middle East to Central Asia.
In 2005, the GCC put its stamp of approval by signing the ‘Framework Agreement for Economic Cooperation between Türkiye and the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf’ to bolster trade between Ankara and the region. It has since then seen several updates.
Mending ties
Experts believe Erdogan’s trip will cap Ankara’s diplomatic efforts since 2021 to mend relations with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi.
In May 2021, then-foreign minister Mevlut Cavusoglu visited Saudi Arabia, the first by a senior Turkish leader in four years.
The same year, UAE’s National Security advisor Sheikh Tahnoun bin Zayed Al Nahyan made an official trip to Türkiye when he met President Erdogan in Ankara.
Following Erdogan’s election victory, the two countries signed a cooperation agreement aiming to expand bilateral trade volume to $40 billion annually.
“The rapprochement that began in 2021 is important because it is necessary for all the sides and the region,” Ertem tells TRT World.
In addition to improving relations with Saudi Arabia and UAE, Erdogan’s visit will consolidate Türkiye’s strong ties with Qatar, experts say.
New investment opportunities
Media reports said the Turkish President’s visit will spur bilateral trade, with up to $30 billion in investment expected to flow into the energy, infrastructure and defence sectors in Türkiye. This includes direct investments worth about $10 billion.
There are reciprocal investment opportunities both sides can benefit from.
Turkish firms have already been contributing to the construction sector in Gulf markets and initiating megaprojects, like highways and stadiums.
“Turkish construction companies have played a major role in Gulf development… and Saudi Arabia recently invited them back as they implement major projects to diversify its economy,” says Justin Alexander, director of Khalij Economics and GCC Analyst for GlobalSource Partners.
In the first half of June, Saudi oil giant Aramco and representatives of Turkish building companies met in Ankara and discussed potential projects through 2025 worth $50 billion in the Gulf kingdom.
It is not the first time Aramco and Turkish construction companies are cooperating on big projects. Previously, Tekfen and Aramco signed a $590 million deal on building gas pipelines for the Haradh Gas Increment Program, an energy project in Saudi Arabia.
In March this year, Türkiye and UAE signed the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA), a free-trade deal that followed Erdogan’s first visit to the UAE last year and his call for business leaders to invest in Türkiye.
Last year, Türkiye’s exports to the UAE recorded $5.3 billion. In addition to expanding non-oil trade, the agreement focuses on the promotion of small and medium-sized enterprises.
The deal aims to create 25 thousand new jobs in both countries, and 100 thousand employment opportunities in Türkiye in the long term.
Energy cooperation
Another area of cooperation is energy, including renewables and non-renewables.
Hicret Battaloglu, a researcher at the Gulf Studies Center of Qatar University, tells TRT World that as an an energy importer, Türkiye has an increasing share of liquefied natural gas (LNG) in its natural gas imports, thanks to its significant energy relations with Qatar.
Qatargas and BOTAS, Türkiye’s Petroleum Pipeline Corporation Company, signed a three-year deal in 2017 for supply of 1.5 million tonnes of LNG per annum over .
This year, BOTAS and Oman’s LNG signed a a similar 10-year agreement for gas supply to Türkiye.
Battaloglu says that for renewables, Türkiye offers an economic diversification agenda for GCC countries whose economies are heavily dependent on revenues from hydrocarbons, oil and gas.
Gulf countries can benefit from Türkiye’s experience in renewable energy, noting its impressive growth in solar, wind and geothermal energy sources.
“In the realm of renewable energy, Türkiye has emerged as an attractive destination for investment from the Gulf monarchies as they embark on ambitious journeys towards post-oil economies and net-zero emissions,” Battaloglu adds.
The Gulf’s thrust on renewable energy gains significance in the light UAE and Saudi Arabia's commitment bring their carbon emissions to net zero, by 2050 and 2060 respectively.
Turkish defence industry
Türkiye’s advances in the defence sector created a demand in the Gulf countries that are willing to build military and defence cooperation with Ankara.
Last year, defence exports to the UAE are expected to increase over the next few years following Abu Dhabi’s purchase of the much-vaunted Bayraktar TB-2 UAVs.
The interest in the drone industry is partly based on the need of these countries to defend their oil facilities in a region constantly in strife, says Battaloglu.
“The Gulf countries strive to diversify their military partnerships and enhance their drone capabilities in response to the escalating non-conventional attacks on oil facilities by both state and non-state actors.”
The Gulf states have been experiencing attacks on shipping and oil facilities since 2018. In 2019 and 2020, Houthi rebels launched drone and missile strikes on a major Saudi oil facility and at an Aramco petroleum product distribution plant.
In 2022, UAE also faced a strike by Iran-backed Yemeni fighters on three petroleum transport tankers near a storage facility for the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company.
According to Battaloglu, cooperation in the defence sector also helps Türkiye to carve both economic and strategic benefits from its homegrown, advanced and cost-effective drone industry.
Strategically, Turkish-made drones have been tested successfully in the Russia-Ukraine conflict and Second Nagorno-Karabakh War.
“The expansion of Türkiye’s defence sector exports and their (drone) effectiveness on the ground significantly bolster Türkiye’s smart power both regionally and internationally.”
Further, arms exports and military cooperation with Gulf states support the autonomous and independent security policy of Türkiye, carrying it into the position of a prominent regional and global player, she adds.
Türkiye, as a NATO member, provides a safe space for Gulf countries to cooperate in defence and technology transfer due to its close relationship with the United States and the West.
“Given the close alliance between the Gulf monarchies and the US, this advantage Türkiye brings holds significant weight.”
Ertem, echoing a similar view on Türkiye’s position as a safe space, says, “Without harming their relations with the US, Gulf countries can develop the defence sector.”
Türkiye’s balancıng act provides an independent space for Gulf countries close to Washington from being caught in the Chinese-US rivalry, Ertem adds.
