By Hannah Ryder
The renewal of grain deal, which was first mediated by Türkiye and the UN in July 2022, is important since it enables goods - including grain and fertiliser - to flow from Ukraine across the Black Sea region to the rest of the world, including the Africa continent.
A month prior to the initial deal, the African Union Chairperson Moussa Faki and the then Chair of the African Union and President of the Republic of Senegal Macky Sall, had travelled to Moscow to press for peace as well as discuss the impact of the war on the African region.
The top AU representatives had done so mandated by African Heads of State in a meeting in early May 2022.
African leaders had identified the problem because 8% of total grain and 12% of total fertiliser imports to Africa come from Ukraine and Russia, and any supply constraints would ultimately lead to inflation and even to potential food shortages.
The choice by Türkiye to take this issue up, making it a priority of its foreign policy to engage with Russia on this question, was no doubt tough.
Türkiye, as a NATO and G20 member, was and remains under significant pressure to sanction and not engage with Russia on any topic – with any alternative action being potentially interpreted as an endorsement of the war.
Listening to African perspectives
Nevertheless, at international forums, Ankara has made its position clear. For instance, Türkiye has consistently endorsed UN General Assembly votes to condemn Russia for its illegal actions on Ukrainian soil and against the people of Ukraine.
However, given the clear African push and mandate, Türkiye’s membership of NATO and the G20, as well as simultaneous proximity to Russia and the African region, afforded the country a unique place in foreign affairs.
The willingness of Turkish government and ability to listen to African perspectives did not just arise in 2022 either. Türkiye first launched its Africa-facing strategy back in 1998 and has so far convened three Türkiye-Africa Partnership Summits - in 2008, in 2014 and in 2021.
The inaugural Summit delivered the Istanbul Declaration and the Framework for Cooperation – which covered a wide range of areas for partnership - from agriculture and agribusiness, to health services, peace and security cooperations and measures of environment protection.
The second Summit adopted the Malabo Declaration and the latest Istanbul Summit in 2021 culminated in a joint Declaration and Action Plan covering peace, security and justice, ‘human-focused development’ and ‘strong and sustainable growth’.
As a development partner to the region, Türkiye has consistently emphasised its focus on support that is not politically or economically conditioned, recognising African sovereignty and indicating a willingness to work with African countries to achieve the AU’s Agenda 2063 – Africa’s collective development plan through 15 flagship projects.
The 2014 Malabo Declaration clearly referenced the AU’s Agenda 2063 Continental Frameworks and including projects as means of prioritising Türkiye’s engagement with Africa.
As a result, both the political and economic relationship between Türkiye and the continent has progressed throughout this period.
Türkiye’s trade volumes with Africa reached $25 billion in 2020 – representing a fivefold increase from $5 billion in 2000, much faster growth than Africa’s traditional development partners, who, often, like Türkiye, offer LDCs in Africa preferential market access.
African governments have engaged Türkiye’s contractors and financiers to build 1,150 infrastructure projects worth over $70 billion – crucial given Africa’s infrastructure deficits.
A welcome new plan is Türkiye’s building of a 368 km section of a railway costing $1.9 billion in Tanzania.
And, perhaps more impressively, Türkiye’s private sector investment stocks in Africa reached just under $2bn in 2019 representing a 3.5% share of overall FDI – higher than most other G20 countries - and appears to be growing rapidly.
Proactively contributing to ensure stability in the region, by avoiding supply chain challenges and inflation, based on an African agenda and ask is crucial.
Especially, that’s what Ankara has done by proactively taking the risk of responsible mediation and doing so successfully.
Beyond the grain deal
It now looks likely that Russian agricultural goods, important for many African countries, will continue to ensure access for trade with Africa, even beyond this latest extension.
The question remains, given this success, what is next for Türkiye? How can Türkiye further contribute African ambitions?
Outside the grain deal, there are several next potential steps for Türkiye to continue to conduce African development and foreign policy priorities.
A key immediate opportunity for Türkiye is to actively concur the strong call that was made by President Macky Sall as the Chair of the AU, for the African region to be fully represented in the G20, just as the EU is – despite the fact that several EU member states are already members of the G20.
Actively and openly backing this righteous African position, as both Beijing and Washington have already done, would help embed Africa into the world’s current international relations structures.
Furthermore, Türkiye pulling its weight for better representation of the African continent on the UN Security Council would have great political and ultimately economic impact.
Beyond this, Türkiye’s finding means to increase added-value imports from the continent and encourage outward green and manufacturing-related private sector investment into the continent is crucial too.
This is especially important this year as African leaders are continuing their work to try to recover from COVID-19 and other supply chain disruptions, including by making the African Union Theme of the Year for 2023 “Acceleration of AfCFTA Implementation”.
The author, Hannah Ryder is the CEO of Development Reimagined, an international development consultancy firm, and a former diplomat and economist with 20 years of experience.
Disclaimer: The viewpoints expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect the opinions, viewpoints and editorial policies of TRT Afrika.
