By Kubra Solmaz
Speaking to TRT World, analysts say any progress towards normalisation between Arab nations and Israel is likely to suffer significant damage, but not the extent of termination.
“Strategically, they (Arab states) will want to maintain these relationships, but now they will need to slow-pedal further rapprochement out of concern for a public backlash at home,” said Joost Hiltermann, the Middle East and North Africa director at the International Crisis group.
He emphasised that the Arab states might not completely sever their relations with Israel, but that they may need to adopt a more discrete approach and minimise certain contacts such as tourism.
The history of normalisation
Israel’s normalisation with an Arab country started with Egypt in 1979, which was followed by Jordan in 1994.
According to Mehmet Rakipoglu, the coordinator of academic studies at Dimension for Strategic Studies, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu attaches immense significance to the ongoing normalisation process, which is at the brink of formally adding a major regional power Saudi Arabia to the list, as having an Arab state on its side has always helped any Israeli leader in-charge to grow in stature.
“Israeli leaders who successfully normalised relations in 1979 and 1994 achieved legendary status in Israeli politics due to Israel's recognition among Arab nations. Hence, the normalisation with Saudi Arabia is of paramount importance for Netanyahu," Rakipoglu said.
Israeli political analyst Nimrod Goren, the head of Mitvim Institute, an Israel-based foreign policy think tank, explains, “The Abraham Accords are among Netanyahu’s notable achievements, and normalisation with Saudi Arabia has been stated by him - multiple times - as a major foreign policy goal of his government.”
Abraham Accords
Three years ago, in 2020, the United States mediated an agreement between the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Israel, committing to normalise ties. In the months following the initial signing by two Muslim nations, Morocco and Sudan joined the accords.
But the new normalisation process under the Abraham Accords as well as normalisation with Saudi Arabia differ from the ones with Egypt and Jordan, says Rakipoglu.
“It’s because both the Egyptian and Jordanian governments were eager for normalisation after [losing] the wars [with Israel]. However, when it comes to these recent normalisation steps, it is driven by the US, and Arab states are proceeding cautiously due to concerns about their public's support for Palestinians.” he explains.
While Rakipoglu views the US’s involvement in these talks negatively, Goren states, “The involvement of the US in current events, will also increase the chances of Israel-Arab relations continuing, also via engaging Arab countries in efforts to stabilise the situation and later on - in seeking a breakthrough towards peace.”
Normalisation talks between Saudi Arabia and Israel
Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, didn't join the 2020 US-brokered Abraham Accords. However, this year during the UN General Assembly in New York, both Saudi Arabia and Israel indicated the potential for normalisation between the two nations.
In an interview with Fox News, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman expressed that ongoing talks with Israel meant the prospect of normalised relations was “getting closer every day.”
“For us, the Palestinian issue is very important. We need to solve that part,” the crown prince said.
Although there has been no official statement from Saudi Arabia or Israel, Reuters reported that Saudi Arabia is delaying its US backed plans to normalise ties with Israel, according to two sources familiar with Riyadh’s stance.
Goren suggests that Netanyahu would want to advance these relations but currently needs to prioritise the Israeli response to the Hamas attack, even if this leads to a temporary setback in normalisation.
In the context of Israel, achieving normalisation with Saudi Arabia holds great importance as it represents the establishment of positive relations with one of the most influential actors in the Arab world.
“Saudi Arabia’s conditions for normalisation are remarkably clear-cut: the establishment of an independent Palestinian state within the borders of 1967. It is of significant note that Saudi Arabia has unwaveringly upheld these demands,”Rakipoglu said.
As for Goren, the war will change the pace of this process for the negative, but should not alter the course of developments.
“After the dust settles, we can expect to see continued progress, whether or not the Saudis make progress in their security negotiations with the US. The timing in which formal Israel-Saudi normalisation will be achieved will depend also on developments on the Israeli-Palestinian front, any might take time - but even until then, progress could be made, and de facto ties can be expanded.”
Since Saudi Arabia’s has kept the prospect of normalising ties with Israel subordinate to the formation of an independent Palestinian state, Joost Hiltermann offers a distinct interpretation for Israel’s way of looking to the normalisation with the Arab world.
“For Israel, normalising relations with Arab states is critical because in that way they hope to end their conflict with the Palestinians without having to grant them an independent state. With Arab financial support they hope to achieve an economic peace: a chance for Palestinians to live but not to take decisions affecting their wellbeing like citizens of a state,” he said.
Rakipoglu however emphasises the significance of other Arab nations that have not yet participated in this normalisation process, such as Qatar and Kuwait – both countries have consistently advocated for an independent Palestinian state along with the 1967 borders.
What Arab societies think about normalisation
In mosques, football stadiums and towns across the Arab world, pro-Palestinain sentiments have surged in the wake of recent Israeli attacks on Gaza, igniting a groundswell of solidarity for the Palestinian cause.
From Ramallah to Beirut, Baghdad and Cairo, people have demonstrated their support through various acts of solidarity such as distributing sweets, saying prayers for the safety of Palestinians and for the success of their resistance against Israel’s long-standing occupation.
In light of the public sentiment, Arab states have been exercising caution while carefully navigating the process of normalisation.
Rakipoglu points out, “Many Arab states have long desired to normalise their ties with Israel. However, recent successes of Hamas have prompted Arab societies to constrain their governments’ policies aimed at normalisation.”
On the flip side, he also underscores that genuine normalisation between Arab nations and Israel remains elusive.
Egypt and Jordan embarked on the path of normalisation with Israel in the aftermath of extensive wars that had erupted since 1948 and the 1967 Arab-Israeli wars. However, the normalisation of the UAE and Bahrain might be seen as not true normalisation, as they already covertly maintained relations with Israel, behind the scenes. These nations neither deployed military troops to Palestine nor provided significant financial aid.
Morocco’s involvement in the normalisation process is attributed to the US’s recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. Rakipoglu notes that, among the parties that signed the Abraham Accords, Sudan has been the most critical.
Sudan’s interim government joined this normalisation process under US pressure, contingent on the removal of Sudan from the list of countries supporting terrorism.
Sudan holds symbolic importance among Muslim countries as during the three-decade rule of Omar Bashir, Sudan was the supporter of Hamas and played a key role in strengthening the Palestinian cause.
According to Rakipoglu, the normalisation between Sudan and Israel could potentially have the most significant impact on the Arab world.
A lot depends on whether Israel pulls back from the fence of Gaza or goes for a full-throttled invasion. If the images of death and destruction, and children in body bags, keeps coming from Gaza, the normalisation is likely to face a setback that would be difficult to reverse.