By Kazim Alam
The government of Mali is clamping down on an unlikely foe: Barrick Gold, the world’s second-biggest gold mining corporation from Canada.
Operating in 18 countries in Africa, Asia and the Americas, Barrick is no stranger to controversy. From underreporting profits and tax evasion to rapes and killings, it has faced accusations of gross misconduct of all kinds in many countries around the world.
But the mining company’s mounting problems in Mali – a landlocked country in West Africa known for its vast natural resources and dire poverty – are of extreme, unusual nature.
Earlier this month, Barrick suspended operations in the Loulo-Gounkoto mining complex, the second-largest of the 13 gold mines it operates worldwide, after the Malian government confiscated three tonnes of the yellow metal worth $245 million and moved it to a custodial bank in the capital city of Bamako.
The Barrick CEO cannot set foot in Mali because of an outstanding arrest warrant over money laundering charges. Four of its executives continue to languish behind bars for almost two months.
The tussle between the Malian government and the Canadian mining company is being viewed as a reflection of the upsurge in pan-Africanism in the region – especially the Sahel states – that seeks to push back against Western influence on the resource-rich continent.
“What's going on in Mali is also going on across the region, in countries like Burkina Faso, Senegal, Ivory Coast. There’s this backlash… this upsurge of resource nationalism, especially with the military governments in the alliance of Sahel states,” Owen Schalk, a Canadian researcher and the co-author of Canada’s Long Fight Against Democracy, tells TRT World.
The Alliance of Sahel States is a mutual defence pact signed recently by Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso following successful military coups in each of the three West African countries between 2020 and 2023.
Each of these military takeovers has been anti-Western in character and filled with fiery anti-colonial rhetoric, Owen says.
“They’ve come to power (by) speaking about pan-Africanism. They’re often harking back to… left-wing nationalist figures who challenged the Western presence there,” he says.
Kathy du Plessis, a Barrick spokesperson, declined to comment.
Russia: alternative military partner
The government in Burkina Faso recently nationalised gold mines in an apparent attempt to exert greater control over their natural resources.
Similarly, the government in Niger took away the mining rights to one of the world’s largest uranium reserves from a French state-owned nuclear fuels company. The country supplies a quarter of the EU’s demand for the metal.
Niger also kicked out US troops, deployed as part of a counterterrorism mission, as the country’s new leadership continued cultivating Russia as an alternative military partner.
According to Kyle Hiebert, a researcher and a former deputy editor of the Africa Conflict Monitor, Russia has “displaced” former colonial ruler France as the “preferred benefactor” of Mali’s junta regime that, with some public support, overthrew the civilian government a few years ago.
French forces were stationed in Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Chad, Djibouti, Gabon, Ivory Coast and Senegal until 2022. But Djibouti and Gabon are now the only two countries with a continuing French presence. The other nations have ended military agreements with France amid demands for greater national sovereignty, resulting in reduced influence of the former colonial power.
After showing UN peacekeepers the door upon assuming power in Mali, the military reportedly brought in the Wagner Group, the private military company controlled until 2023 by Yevgeny Prigozhin, a former close ally of President Vladimir Putin, who was killed in a plane crash in 2024.
Hiebert says the group has now been “rebranded as Russia’s Africa Corps”, with its connections being “formalised within bilateral relations” between Moscow and African countries.
The resource-for-protection model is apparently thriving across West Africa as the Russian group protects mining sites and trains local security forces.
The new mining code
Barrick has not been the only Canadian mining company to get the short end of the stick in Mali.
Canadian firms B2Gold and Allied Gold had to make concessions to authorities under a new mining code to continue operations.
Nearly 100 Canadian mining companies operate in Africa. The biggest chunk of these investments ($14 billion) is concentrated in West Africa, with Mali alone making up almost half of all Canadian mining assets in the region.
With 105 tonnes of gold output, Mali was the second-largest producer of the precious metal in Africa in 2023, data by the World Gold Council shows.
Even though Barrick is just one of the many Canadian miners in Mali, the firm’s operation is so wide-scale that it alone accounts for up to 10 percent of the country’s total economic output.
The Malian government introduced a new mining code in 2023, which required foreign mining corporations to share a greater chunk of profits with the government.
More specifically, the new code allows the Malian government and the local community to own a stake of up to 35 percent in every mining project operated by a multinational company. Earlier, the upper limit for Malian stakes in such projects was 20 percent.
Barrick owns 80 percent of the Loulo-Gounkoto mining complex.
Initially, Barrick insisted that the 2023 mining code should not apply to existing operations. But it shifted gears later, signalling its willingness to make it work under the new code.
Owen says that the real reason the company’s relationship with the government fell apart was a state audit, which uncovered “millions” of dollars in unpaid funds from foreign mining companies, Owen says.
“Barrick said, no, this is not legitimate. We had an agreement, we were willing to work within the new mining code. But this audit is kind of going too far, and things got worse and worse from there,” Owen says.
He expects the Canadian government to marshal all its diplomatic might in support of Barrick, even though the company has embroiled itself in all kinds of commercial and ethical conflicts globally.
Enter: Canadian government
The Canadian government has always sprung into action to save Barrick from facing the consequences of its dubious business dealings.
“There’s a long list of countries that Barrick has invested in. Problems follow Barrick everywhere it goes. Argentina, Peru, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Mali, Tanzania,” Owen says, adding that the company is now expected to drag the Canadian government into a conflict with Mali.
Tanzania, one of the largest gold producers in Africa, threatened in 2017 to impose a ban on the export of gold concentrate, which would have cut into Barrick’s profits.
The Tanzanian government had found that the quantity of gold in the exported concentrates – unrefined metal requiring further processing – was “much larger” than the declared quantity.
In addition, the Tanzanian government also accused Barrick of stealing “billions in unpaid taxes, penalties, and interest”.
Confidential emails obtained by an independent researcher showed Barrick sought “emergency help” from the Canadian government, which used foreign aid as a negotiation tool with Tanzania to resolve the issue.
“They got the Canadian high commission to threaten to cut off aid to Tanzania if it didn’t figure out an agreement with Barrick,” says Yves Engler, a Montreal-based researcher and author of Canada in Africa: 300 Years of Aid and Exploitation.
“Barrick has been a very powerful player in Canadian foreign policy,” he tells TRT World.
Canada’s foreign policy is structured to advance the mining sector. “Mining codes in countries throughout Africa were rewritten in large part with Canadian aid,” he adds.
One of the reasons Barrick enjoys an outsized influence in foreign policy is that Peter Munk, the company’s founder, set up the “most important foreign policy school” in Canada, Engler says.
The Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy at the University of Toronto is a “top school” for Canadians who want to work in the federal government.
“He was a very influential player in the Canadian foreign policy world. We’ve seen that manifest in different forms, Canadian aid to advance Barrick’s interests… using Canadian diplomats to advance Barrick’s interests.”
Renegotiating signed-and-sealed contracts
Engler says the idea that sovereign countries lose the right to revisit mining contracts once they sign up for so-called foreign investment protection agreements is untenable.
“Countries have the right to change their mind. Canadian mining companies try to insulate themselves from the ability of national governments to change policy. That’s why they are so keen on these foreign investment protection agreements,” he says.
Canadian businesses invest globally under tailor-made investment protection agreements, which include a dispute settlement mechanism. The standard practice protects Canadian investors from adverse consequences of abrupt policy change in foreign countries through international tribunals.
One way to prevent Canadian mining companies from leveraging the country’s diplomatic corps for commercial gains is the appointment of an ombudsperson to investigate and withdraw all public support for corporations involved in shady business deals and human rights abuses, he says.
“There should be legislation that strengthens the ability to hold mining companies to account in local courts. We’ve got to stop with these foreign investment protection agreements,” he says.
