When French President Emmanuel Macron arrived in Nairobi in May 2026 for the Africa Forward Summit, he came armed with an ambitious offer: €23 billion in investment commitments, promises of equal partnership, and a message that France was ready to turn a new page in its relationship with Africa.
Yet for many observers across the continent, the question was less about what Macron brought than what France left behind.
Over the previous three years, France had been pushed out of a string of African countries that once formed the backbone of its influence on the continent. Military leaders in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger expelled French troops. Chad followed suit. Even long-standing partners such as Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire requested a reduction or withdrawal of France’s military presence.
The retreat marked one of the most dramatic setbacks to French influence in Africa since independence. It also raised a deeper question: can France genuinely reinvent its relationship with Africa, or is it simply searching for new partners after losing old ones?
A declaration that raised eyebrows
One moment at the Nairobi summit captured the tensions surrounding France’s renewed African engagement.
“We are the true Pan-Africanists,” Macron declared.
The remark quickly drew attention. Pan-Africanism is rooted in the struggles against colonialism, slavery and racial domination. It is a political and intellectual tradition associated with figures such as Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere and Thomas Sankara.
For some, hearing France’s president invoke the language of Pan-Africanism highlighted how difficult it remains for Paris to navigate its complex history with Africa.
That history continues to shape perceptions of France across much of the continent today.
The long shadow of Françafrique
Unlike Britain’s largely indirect model of colonial administration, France pursued a more ambitious assimilation project. The objective was not simply political control but cultural transformation. French language, education and institutions were promoted as vehicles through which colonial subjects could become part of a broader French identity.
“The French perpetuated a culture of France in these countries, where people were socialised into believing that they could become French citizens,” Christopher Iike, Professor of African Politics and International Relations at the University of Pretoria, tells TRT Afrika.
“In practice, what this meant was that many African leaders were propped up by French support in exchange for favourable policies and access to their countries’ resources. What that perpetuated was corruption and authoritarianism, and that is the direct line to the widespread discontent we see today in Francophone West Africa.”
Following independence, France retained influence through a system that became known as Françafrique.
The arrangement extended beyond diplomatic ties. It included military agreements, intelligence cooperation, political networks and economic structures that bound former colonies to Paris long after formal colonial rule ended.
One of the most visible symbols was the CFA franc, the currency used by 14 African countries and historically linked to France through monetary agreements.
“Many of France’s former colonies had their central banks controlled by France,” says Iike.
“When they needed money for development, they would go to France to apply for loans and France would determine how much to give them, even though this was their own money. When you know that, you begin to understand some of the anti-French sentiments you see in Francophone Africa today.”
According to security and geopolitical analyst Fidel Amakwe Oguzu, former French President Charles De Gaulle built a system that served even broader strategic objectives.
“De Gaulle understood that after independence there would be many African countries represented in the UN General Assembly,” he tells TRT Afrika. “If France wanted influence there, it needed those votes. This was about resources, yes, but it was also about maintaining France’s position at the global table through its African relationships.”
Countries that challenged the arrangement often faced consequences.
“The Republic of Guinea opted out of the French community, and France removed every piece of colonial infrastructure it had built almost overnight,” Oguzu says.
Looking east
The collapse of French influence in the Sahel marked the end of an era in a region once regarded as central to France’s African strategy.
“They did send a powerful signal that relationships perceived as subordinate rather than equal are no longer acceptable.”
Faced with declining influence in its traditional sphere, France has increasingly looked beyond Francophone Africa.
The decision to host the Africa Forward Summit in Kenya was widely interpreted as part of that shift.
Kenya is not a former French colony. It is East Africa’s largest economy and a major hub for technology, renewable energy and regional trade.
For some analysts, however, the choice raises questions.
“What would have conveyed genuine remorse and genuine partnership would have been to return to those countries where France has had difficult relationships and begin addressing some of the damaging policies of the past,” says Iike.
“Instead, France appears to be pivoting toward Anglophone Africa. Is this a genuine desire to engage more broadly, or is it simply a case of ‘if I am not wanted here, I will go somewhere else’?”
Others see the move differently.
“Kenya is a major economic and innovation hub,” geopolitical strategist Nhial Deng tells TRT Afrika. “Holding the summit there signals interest in engaging African economies based on current relevance and strategic opportunity.”
“I don’t think a change of venue alone indicates a policy shift, but it does reflect an evolution in both France’s relationship with Africa and Africa’s relationship with France.”
“France still maintains relationships with Senegal, Morocco, Tunisia, Togo, Benin, Cameroon, the Republic of Congo, Gabon, Madagascar and Djibouti, among others,” says Oguzu.
The Nairobi summit was part of a broader outreach effort. France has deepened engagement with countries such as Ghana and Nigeria, signing new agreements on health, security and investment.
According to Oguzu, the shift reflects France’s recognition that Africa’s geopolitical landscape has changed.
“France is saying: we are here, we know the Chinese are here, the Americans are here, the British are here, and we are not going anywhere despite the challenges we have faced in the Sahel.”
Russia has expanded its footprint in parts of the Sahel following France’s departure. China continues to deepen its infrastructure and investment presence through the Belt and Road Initiative. Türkiye has significantly expanded diplomatic, economic and security partnerships across the continent.
The result is an Africa where external powers no longer enjoy uncontested spheres of influence. With more options, African governments have greater bargaining power and increasing confidence in defining the terms of engagement.
Partnership or dependency?
At the heart of France’s new Africa strategy lies investment.
The €23 billion package unveiled in Nairobi covers sectors including energy, agriculture and artificial intelligence. For Paris, it represents a new model of engagement centred on economic cooperation rather than military influence.
But questions remain about who will determine how those funds are used.
“There can be partnership, but is it an equal partnership? Or is it one where one side continues to take instructions from the other?”
Deng argues that the effectiveness of such investments will depend on African leadership.
“For capital at this scale to achieve meaningful and sustainable impact, it needs to be integrated into domestic planning systems and economic strategies,” he says.
“Those strategies must be Africa-led. France should not define where the money goes or what conditions are attached to it. If these investments do not align with national development plans or the African Union’s Agenda 2063, then the value of the partnership becomes questionable.”
Oguzu believes African governments have more leverage than before. “No country — not China, not the United States, not any European country — is in Africa solely to advance Africa’s interests,” he says.
“You need to negotiate. Twenty-three billion euros entering your economy creates opportunities, but governments must decide how that money is used. The leverage exists. The question is whether African leaders use it.”
Governments across Africa are increasingly willing to challenge external partners when national interests are perceived to be at stake. In 2025, Kenyan President William Ruto cancelled a major highway contract with French infrastructure company Vinci Highways, citing concerns over costs.
“We are going to have relationships. But we must behave like sovereign countries, negotiate like sovereign countries and put the interests of our people first,” says Oguzu.
“France has a right to be in Africa. The real question is on what terms.”
The real test
For France, the Africa Forward Summit delivered important optics. Thirty African heads of state endorsed a joint declaration and Paris could point to new partnerships and investment commitments.
But one fact remained impossible to ignore: the countries that expelled France from the Sahel were not in the room.
“France rebuilt its image with the partners it still has,” says Iike. “What it did not do was address its estrangement from the countries it lost.”
Whether France’s pivot succeeds may depend less on new summits and investment pledges than on its willingness to confront the legacy of Françafrique itself.
For many African analysts, the larger question is not whether France can reinvent its role on the continent. “The most important question,” says Deng, “is where Africa wants to be in ten years and who can help get it there.”
